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ABSTRACT
This article introduces three small, European stateless nations that –
invigorated by pervasive metropolitanisation phenomena – are
increasingly shaping calls for devolution: Catalonia, the Basque
Country and Scotland. These three nations are re-scaling their
respective nation-states (Spain and the UK) in different ways: (i)
being bolstered by their metropolitan hubs (Barcelona, Bilbao, and
Glasgow) and (ii) generating a stateless ‘civic nationalism’ rooted
in the metropolitan ‘right to decide’. Oppositional response to this
‘civic nationalism’ has re-emerged as state-centric ‘ethnic
nationalism’. This article concludes that gaining or lacking
metropolitan support for the ‘right to decide’ will establish the
future directions of devolution debates.
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Introduction: re-scaling the nation-state through metropolitanisation
Just as the world has continuously urbanized over the last several decades, it has also
rapidly metropolitanised (Brenner, 2003; Sellers & Walks, 2013) by reinforcing the re-
scaling of nation-states through multiple interconnected factors. In Europe, the aftermath
of the referendum on Scottish independence (Calzada, 2014) and the UK’s continued
membership in the EU (Brexit) (Johnston, Manley, Pattie, & Jones, 2018; MacLeod &
Jones, 2018; Rodríguez-Posé, 2018), as well as the political struggle in Catalonia and the
resulting territorial crisis in Spain (Rodon & Guinjoan, 2018), are key to examining
how pervasive metropolitanisation phenomena have recently triggered wider devolution
debates regarding the organization and legitimation of nation-state power institutionally
and territorially as well as politically and democratically (Jessop, 1990).
To introduce how metropolitanisation phenomena are increasingly shaping calls for
devolution, this article focuses on three small European, stateless, city-regionalised
nations (Ehrlich, 1997; Hepburn, 2008): Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Scotland.
In these cases, the nations are re-scaling their respective nation-states (Spain and the
UK), fuelled by a ‘civic nationalism’ rooted in the metropolitan ‘right to decide’ (as an
updated version of the ‘right to the city’ principle) and bolstered by their metropolitan
hubs (Barcelona, Bilbao, and Glasgow). However, (i) the interplay among political
parties and (ii) the parties’ positions regarding the ‘right to decide’ differ considerably
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in each case (Figures 2 and 3). As a counterargument to the previous trend – and in oppo-
sition to exercising the ‘right to decide’ through referendum or consultation by defending a
fixed state-territorial uniformity – state-centric ‘ethnic nationalistic’ expressions with
different rationales have recently (re)emerged in Spain and the UK (Figure 1).
Given the timely literature on these three case studies (Cetrà & Harvey, 2018; Mulle &
Serrano, 2018; Rodon & Guinjoan, 2018), the research question posed in this article
addresses how the metropolitan phenomena in each case uniquely interact with calls
for devolution while also updating our understanding of the classical division between
civic and ethnic nationalism in the UK and Spain (Berlin, 1979; Guibernau, 2013;
Lecours, 2000). Thus, this article attempts to answer the research question by exploring
two main ideas: (i) metropolitanisation phenomena are responsible for invigorating the
claim of the ‘right to decide’ in these three city-regionalised nations due to the official
growing support being manifested through regional and city council parliamentary elec-
tions as well as the crowded grassroots demonstrations regularly occurring in Barcelona,
Bilbao, and Glasgow (Figure 2); and (ii) this claim challenges our perceptions and
interpretations of both civic and ethnic nationalism (Lecours, 2000) (Figure 1). Conse-
quently, in the early contours of this article, the ‘right to decide’ is defined as the ‘right
by members of the nation to defend and exercise, through referenda or consultation,
their right to be recognised as a demos able to decide upon their political destiny triggered
by their desire to share a common fate’ (Guibernau, 2013, p. 411).
Paralleling intertwined debates on devolution through the ‘right to decide’, pervasive
divides have been revealed to exist under the surface of the discursive homogeneity of
democratic representation in nation-states, including the divide between (i) the ‘metropo-
litan’ and the ‘non-metropolitan’ (Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 2016; Mulligan, 2013) and
recently between (ii) the ‘stateless city-regionalised’ and the ‘state-centric’. Regarding
the ‘metropolitan’ divide, to an extent, the Brexit referendum and growing support for
populist candidates have clarified that the most potent divisions exist between the so-
called ‘metropolitan elite’ and the more peripheral (provincial), rural ‘rest’ – i.e. places
that ‘don’t matter’ (Rodríguez-Posé, 2018). The ‘national’ divide may be viewed as the
outcome of the perceived unevenness with which certain city-regions ‘have a stake’ in pol-
itical decisions regarding nation-state development; in turn, the divide shapes those per-
ceptions of difference when small stateless nations in Europe claim the ‘right to decide’
about their own futures. Through the connection between the ‘metropolitan’ and the
‘national’ divides analyzed in the three cases in the fourth section, this article reveals
that civic nationalism can be interpreted as an emerging structural response that blends
devolution claims, metropolitan inclusiveness as a social value, and a politically and
socially progressivist agenda; this is shown by the programmes of the civic nationalist
political parties and the rhetoric of the grassroots movements in each case (Figure 2)
(Gillespie, 2016; Massetti, 2018; Sage, 2014).
As a result, in its third section, this article suggests three hypotheses that may currently
be determining those ‘metropolitan’ and ‘national’ divides: (i) socio-economics (geoeco-
nomic hypothesis), (ii) identity and sense of belonging to a stateless nation (geopolitical
hypothesis), and (iii) democratic demand for the ‘right to decide’ (geodemocratic hypoth-
esis) (Figure 2). To a point, such hypotheses might indicate a shift in the fixed territorial
interpretation of national politics due to a wide range of preferences for territorial decen-
tralization. Accordingly, self-government and devolution accommodation regimes
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provided by nation-states to city-regions continue to be perceived as insufficient by civic
nationalist movements, resulting in further tensions among territorial statehood, spaces of
historical identity, and future secessionist aspirations (Mulle & Serrano, 2018). One means
by which nation-states can address this tension is to seek outright independence to recon-
cile small nations’ spaces of identity and statehood through referenda, as occurred in Scot-
land in 2014 (Sanghera, Botterill, Hopkins, & Arshad, 2018). However, Cetrà and Harvey
(2018, p. 1) predict that ‘independence referendums will continue to be rare events’
(Qvortrup, 2014). Conservatives in the UK have recently adopted a more restrictive pos-
ition on the ‘right to decide’, and unfavourable conditions for the ‘right to decide’ will
likely remain in Spain despite attempts by the newly appointed government led by the
Social-Democrats (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) to unravel plurinational
and federal dilemmas.
Such hindrances raise major questions about basic democratic principles that are based
on the ‘right to decide’ and the provision of egality of representation in the tripartite com-
bination of citizenship, government, and existing nation-states such as the UK and Spain
(Cagiao y Conde & Ferraiuolo, 2016; Crameri, 2016; Davidson, 2016; López, 2018).
However, the UK and Spain provide very diverse political contexts that are embedded
in different conceptions of the nation-state and constitutional designs; these conceptions
are primarily mononational in Spain and primarily plurinational in the UK, but they are
multiple and contested in both cases. The four constituent nations of the UK exhibited
centrally orchestrated regional devolution in 1997 under the new Labour government.
Since the Franco years in Spain, the central government has continuously insisted on
re-centralization to resist efforts promoting a devolved allocation of powers, as observed in
the intervention into Catalan autonomy via the state control of Catalan institutions – a
response to the ‘illegal referendum’ that occurred on 1 October 2017; that ‘referendum’
was a clear turning point in the acceleration of this confrontation (Cetrà & Harvey,
2018; Cetrà, Casanas-Adam, & Tàrrega, 2018). Since then, that confrontation has pro-
voked the (re)emergence of a state-centric banal (and majority) nationalism characterized
by responding through the recentralisation of hegemonic ethnic patterns (Bieber, 2018).
This article is structured as follows. The next section examines the (re)emergence of two
opposing versions of nationalism – stateless civic nationalism and state-centric ethnic
nationalism as a response to the former – in the UK and in Spain through a theoretical
framework. The third section presents the three aforementioned hypotheses of civic
nationalism in detail; the fourth section analyses the three cases. The final section con-
cludes that the metropolitan-driven demand for the ‘right to decide’ may provoke and
determine new unique waves and scenarios regarding devolution debates in each case.
However, a heterogenous ‘transformative alliance’ around civic nationalist patterns will
likely continue gathering a wide range of ‘progressivist’ political parties, social movements,
and civic groups rooted in the metropolitan realm. These entities are likely to be self-
organised in a novel communitarian amalgamation, creating deep fissures in the contem-
porary nation-states of Spain and the UK. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, this
article attempts to prescribe no certain outcome that resulted in the metropolitan play-
ground for the three analyzed cases. Instead, this article targets reflecting subtle – and
sometimes less visible – ongoing trends in the devolution debate that are not generalizable
and do not ignore patterns that could transcend particular cases.
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Theoretical framework: the emergence of ‘civic/metropolitanised
nationalism’ in small stateless city-regionalised nations
In 1979, Berlin noted that ‘nationalism seems the strongest force in the world’ (p. 349).
However, he also anticipated the potential link between civic nationalism and the eman-
cipatory role of cities through the claims of the ‘right to decide’, stating ‘nationalism
springs, as often as not, from a wounded or outraged sense of human dignity, the
desire for recognition’ (1996, p. 252). In 2000, Lecours elucidated that ‘the distinction
between ethnic and civic nationalism is firmly rooted in a conception of development
that rests on the dichotomy between traditional and modern societies’ (p. 153).
However, he also acknowledged significant criticisms of the ethnic–civic distinction due
to its Manichean character (Brown, 1999). In response to this observation, this article
has re-conceptualised the ethnic and civic categories of nationalism as ideal-types at
two ends of a continuum with the ‘right to decide’ as the determinant, as most nationalist
movements are not purely ethnic or purely civic. Despite these criticisms, the ethnic–civic
distinction is widely used and is considered a useful analytical tool, but accepting it as a
theoretical framework may remain problematic (Maxwell, 2018). Far from rejecting this
distinction, this article attempts to foster a discussion that should lead to further research
that will improve theoretical frameworks and analytical tools; such research should lead to
better empirical examinations of the emergent and timely correlation among metropolita-
nisation, the ‘right to decide’, devolution, and the types of nationalism.
Thus, two opposing versions of nationalism have (re)emerged alongside the aforemen-
tioned metropolitanisation phenomena in recent years: (i) an ethnically based, non-metro-
politanised, state-centric, exclusive, and right-wing populist nationalism, also known as
‘Banal Nationalism’ (Billig, 1995; Koch & Paasi, 2016), and (ii) a civic, more inclusive,
metropolitan-based stateless nationalism that embraces ethnic diversity and articulates a
more progressivist and emancipatory social democratic nationalism. Thus, the presence
of a more inclusive and metropolitan-influenced image of ‘nation’ and belonging differen-
tiates both types of nationalism. In accordance with a recent analysis (Keating, 2017), this
article argues that a dividemay emerge between these two conceptualisations of nationalism
in Europe (see Figure 1), ethnic vs civic, with civicness acting as an integrationist mechan-
ism.Civic/metropolitanisednationalismflourishes bymerging the agendas of emancipatory
nationalism with urban and metropolitan interests and civicness, as evidenced by devolu-
tion being articulated and operationalized as a political agenda (Mulle & Serrano, 2018).
Nationalism can be very divisive, as demonstrated by ethnic nationalism. This divisive-
ness can be illustrated by the discourse propagated in the UK by the UK Independence
Party (UKIP). That discourse uses European continental citizens in the UK as explicit
‘others’. Such divisiveness in Spain can (possibly) also be perceived not only in the dis-
course of the Citizens’ Party (Ciudadanos, the Cs) but also more explicitly in the new
emerging far-right Vox Party’s recent events in the southern region of Andalusia. Both
parties oppose Catalan independence and reinforce Spanish territorial integrity by
‘seeing only Spanish nationals’ and treating Catalonia as another standard Spanish
region being subtly re-centralised by the central government. On the other hand, civic
nationalism, as a metropolitan updated version of the ‘right to the city’, appeals to univer-
sal values such as freedom and equality that underpin the ‘right to decide’ one’s own
future. This attitude is rooted in a long history of cities’ political empowerment and in
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the rights of their citizens (Arendt, 1949; Purcell, 2013). The distinction of a civic, metro-
politanised nationalism suggests that now may be the time to adapt the specific expression
‘metropolitanised nationalism’ to the right to self-determination claimed by small stateless
city-regionalised nations that possess strong and dominant metropolitan centres in
Europe with leading international connections. In contrast, ethnic nationalism appears
as an aggressively exclusive and nostalgic narrative drawing on racism or (reinterpreted)
historic precedence to set one nation apart from others. The UKIP and the Cs argue for
maintaining or even reinforcing the territorial integrity of their existing states in the
UK and Spain; their rhetoric fundamentally advocates state-national uniformity and
thus internal cultural homogeneity within the state. This phenomenon is remarkable
for the Basque Country, as the Cs – with no political representation in the regional parlia-
ment thus far – have been constantly attacking the economic agreement with the nation-
state (concierto económico; Uriarte, 2015); this is the broadly supported pillar of devolution
in the city-region. However, while the UKIP vehemently seeks to set England (and the
entire UK) apart from the rest of the EU, the Cs reinforces its state-centric position by
advocating for the re-centralization of the entire Spanish nation-state.
In the UK, it can be assumed that one’s political decisions are based on one’s metropo-
litan circumstances. Research findings on the Brexit vote have revealed that ‘Brexiters’
have similar ‘age and education profiles as well as the historical importance of manufac-
turing employment, low income and high unemployment’ (Becker et al., 2016, p. 1). The
profile of ‘Brexiters’ resonates with the non-metropolitan conditions of these ‘left behind’
voters, a situation that has resulted in a growing sense of disempowerment and alienation
among those who are not ‘part of the system’. For a large portion of this population, the
Figure 1. Theoretical framework: Non-metropolitanised (ethnic) and metropolitanised (civic) national-
isms through the unfavourable/favourable positions regarding the ‘right to decide’.
346 I. CALZADA
Brexit vote became a proxy for their sense of political detachment from the political estab-
lishment (the ‘elite’) as well as for underlying societal, economic, and geographic divisions;
only after the vote did many people actually engage with the facts regarding leaving the EU
instead of focusing on populist claims regarding EU membership (Patberg, 2018). The
Brexit issue illustrates that identities and related political agendas are no longer being
expressed in territorially homogeneous units demarcated by boundaries or borders
(Beel, Jones, & Jones, 2018; MacLeod & Jones, 2018). Instead, identities – and thus, per-
ceptions of belonging – develop a more explicit metropolitan versus non-metropolitan
dichotomy, and both groups hold different views of the world, especially the threats/
benefits of globalization. While the metropolitan perspective (civic nationalism) more
readily sees opportunities for inclusiveness and considers a broader notion of identity
as a multi-scalar construct, the non-metropolitan view (ethnic nationalism) examines
the threats and uncertainties of metropolitan areas, perceiving the metropolitan popu-
lation as part of the threat (Winlow, Hall, & Treadwell, 2017).
In Spain, the path out of the current Catalan crisis, namely, the state-to-nation identity
nexus threatening the very integrity of the nation-state, appears to be less clear (Serrano,
2013). This crisis is rooted in the difficulty confronting the state-centric Spanish political
vision as it attempts to democratically accommodate quests for greater self-determination
to prevent potential challenges to the existing integrity of statehood. However, this lack of
accommodation has resulted in just that: an increasingly more confrontational and cen-
trifugal dynamic that undermines the very state that is supposed to be protected by the
constitutional status quo.
Hence, in the aftermath of the Catalan crisis in Spain, certain state-centric political
parties, such as the UKIP in the UK as well as the Cs, Vox, and the former Spanish
ruling party, the Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP), have utilized this sense of disconnect
and turned it into populist – often conservative – discourses and agendas. This type of dis-
course advocates a fixed state-territorial uniformity that can be presented as an effectively
sacred legal arrangement, as in the current case in Spain.
Against the backdrop of these contexts, the emergence of civic/metropolitanised
nationalism may be explained through three intertwined processes. These processes
stem from the same nature of the role of metropolitanisation, occurring in parallel –
though in a unique fashion as shown in Figure 2 – in the three analyzed city-regions:
(i) a growing urban/metropolitan awareness of and assertiveness in pursuing self-
interests;
(ii) an awakening of more explicit regional identities defined around particular civic
characteristics, especially where distinct historical and/or cultural identities (nation-
hood) exist, resulting in a push to define and pursue self-interest more explicitly
within an existing nation-state system; and
(iii) a new metropolitanised city-regional identity based on the combination of processes
i and ii. In cases where processes 1 and 2 combine, the metropolitan and (small)
national imaginations, discourses, and political devolution agendas may overlap,
intertwine, and fuse through the metropolitan lens into an image of nationhood.
This image of nationhood may be based on identity, the perception of belonging,
an active claim to civilian rights, and an explicit strategy for becoming an inter-
national actor with its own voice in the EU.
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Hence, in the three analyzed cases in this paper, the role of metropolitanisation is
embodied through the intersection of the three processes explained above by allowing
Barcelona, Bilbao, and Glasgow to accomplish three leading political functions in their
particular city-regional realm: first, to strategise strong external outreach through the
city-region’s international connections; second, to articulate a tailored city-regional
internal composition with their aforementioned metropolitan hubs’ leadership (5th
dimension in Figure 2); and ultimately, to spark devolution debates by provoking
controversies and tensions in the metropolitan playground among those in favour and
in opposition to the ‘right to decide’ (Figure 3).
These processes are evident in the three small stateless city-regionalised nations where
urban values merge with a nationalistic discourse of citizenship, community, identity, and
political autonomy. As nation-states might no longer be able to manage the increasing
complexity of their cities and regions in the pursuit of cohesion, stateless small city-regio-
nalised nations have sought to develop greater independence and a stronger presence on
the global stage through their internationally visible (and engaged) city-regions (Calzada,
2015). The on-going evolution of strategies among stateless nationalist parties highlights
an increasing presence and prevalence of city-ness and a metropolitan-driven approach to
their policies (Massetti & Schakel, 2017) (Figure 2). Fundamentally, these parties have
found it more relevant to base their aspirations on merging democratic and civic argu-
ments with culturally and historically unique identities that extend out in a broader Euro-
pean political sense (Massetti, 2018). However, this approach contrasts with populist
right-wing protectionist choices, suggesting the co-existence of diverse nationalistic
approaches. For instance, Keating (2005) has extensively researched nationalistic
responses to devolution in the UK, concluding that ‘Scotland is more committed than
England to the traditional public sector model, emphasizing egalitarianism and
cooperation with the public service professionals. This contrasts with the English emphasis
on consumer choice and competition’ (p. 453).
Thus, civic/metropolitanised nationalism appears to be a novel and currently emerging
paradigm, as these new, peaceful democratic movements represent the ‘right to decide’
within the democratic framework constructed by the EU. As this article attempts to illus-
trate, these phenomena suggest another potential interpretation of a civic nationalistic per-
spective, one that argues that metropolitan city-regions actually breed civic nationalism.
Thus, the small stateless city-regionalised nations presented here are defined as internally
structured and externally projected geopolitical networks capable of conforming to
nation-state dynamics. These metropolitanisation phenomena paradoxically go hand-
in-hand with the international growth of metropolitan economic dominance and with
the increasingly loud political voices advocating small stateless city-regionalised nations.
Metropolitan hubs seek more power to decide on their own policies, thus triggering
strong support for devolution and the ‘right to decide’ and inevitably re-scaling and trans-
forming – not eroding – nation-states (Brenner, 2003).
This article does not deny that the literature often argues that cities are global and cos-
mopolitan with no linkage to nationalisms. However, the article does argue that civic/
metropolitanised nationalism certainly connects with the concept of ‘cosmopolitan
nationalism’ because, from a normative perspective, Guibernau (2013, p. 413) envisions
civic, metropolitanised, and emancipatory nationalism as a tool with which to construct
an urban democratic society that defends social justice, deliberative democracy, and
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individual freedom in Europe. This perspective contrasts with that of non-democratic and
manipulative forms of nationalism related to populists ‘over splitting popular sovereignty’,
as some authors have previously examined (Cagiao y Conde, 2018; Kymlicka & Straehle,
1999; Patberg, 2018). As recently confirmed by a BBC survey conducted by Curtice (2018),
‘What nationalism means in England and Scotland differ considerably’. Thus, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between nationalism in terms of the ethnic nationalist arguments pre-
sented by UKIP and civic nationalist claims by the Scottish National Party (SNP; Sage,
2014) in the UK. The same state-centric and ethnic identification could be established
in Spain based on the winner (in votes) of the 2017 regional elections in Catalonia, the
Cs, and the former ruling party in Spain, the PP (Convery & Lundberg, 2017). Objectively,
both embrace recentralisation and a liberal agenda while also being extremely confronta-
tional towards the Catalan civic nationalist movement – an approach that intensified after
1 October 2017 – even when they represent the minority block (Cetrà et al., 2018). It
should be noted that this anti-‘right to decide’ block (Cs, the PP, and the PSC) presently
represents 43% and 29% of the regional parliaments of Catalonia and the city council of
Barcelona, respectively (Figure 3).
Thus, in Spain and the UK, the following political parties officially advocate the ‘right to
decide’: (i) in Catalonia, the Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Cat-
alunya, ERC), the Catalan European Democratic Party (Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català,
PDeCAT) and the Popular Unity Candidacy (Candidatura d’Unitat Popular, CUP); (ii) in
the Basque Country, Basque Country United (Euskal Herria Bildu, EH Bildu) and the
Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV); and (iii) in Scotland, post-
Brexit negotiations and the UK Prime Minister’s statement that ‘now is not the time for
a second independence referendum’ made it clear that the SNP and the Green party
might be the only two parties advocating for the ‘right to decide’ and chasing a second
independence referendum (Figures 2 and 3).
Consequently, this article has made the difficult methodological decision to classify the
political parties on one side of the civic–ethnic nationalism continuum in a manner consist-
ent with this article’s research question, i.e. based solely on their favourable or unfavourable
positions regarding the ‘right to decide’ (3rd determinant in Figure 1). To avoid a normative
and subjective ideological position while being equally conscious that a methodological
selection must be made, two main contextual criteria have been considered (Figure 2): (i)
each political party’s official position on the exercise of the ‘right to decide’ as validated
through the number of MPs in the regional parliament and city council (6th dimension)
and (ii) the intensity of grassroot demonstrations in the three main metropolitan hubs
(9th dimension). Nonetheless, this article acknowledges the not-insignificant implications
of several political parties, revealing subtle ambiguities regarding their positions on the
‘right to decide’. For instance, the PSOE and the Socialists’ Party of Catalonia (Partit dels
Socialistes de Catalunya, PSC; Tatham & Mbaye, 2018, p. 659) which is the Catalan
branch – despite being clear instigators of the early ‘Catalanist’ movement – as well as
the Socialist Party of the Basque Country-Basque Country Left (Partido Socialista de
Euskadi-Euskadiko Ezkerra, PSE-EE), which is the Basque branch, have regularly manifested
an official position contrary to the ‘right to decide’. With subtle ambiguities, the positions of
those branches differ substantially and discursively from the positive attitude of Podemos-
related branches in Catalonia and the Basque Country, that is, the branches known as
CatComú/Podem and Elkarrekin/Podemos, respectively.
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Three hypotheses of civic/metropolitanised nationalism: geoeconomics,
geopolitics and geodemocratics
This article’s main hypothesis is that diverse city-region-based political strategies articu-
lated by political parties are determined by metropolitan or non-metropolitan modi
vivendi and operandi, respectively, which inform the understanding and framing of the
nature of nationalism and its territorial manifestations as either ethnically exclusive or
civically inclusive. Discursively, ethnic nationalism derives its rationale from a reimagined
historic past with old nation-state references driven by populism, whereas civic national-
ism establishes a new set of values around ‘metropolitan’ complex dynamism.
Metropolitan pressures on a state’s territorial manifestation differ. Small stateless
nations, as with distinct and dominant city-regions, increasingly appear to combine
local metropolitan agendas with democratic and governance experimentation, shaping
their own versions of a ‘right to decide’ their futures beyond the ‘given’ frameworks of
their respective nation-states. Similarly, when confronting these increasingly trans-
scalar engagements, metropolitan governance has been capable of re-scaling nation-
states by questioning and altering the discursive dominance of territorial competitiveness
(geoeconomic hypothesis; Harrison, 2007). Consequently, attention and initiatives move
towards articulating quests for a greater political scope of self-determination (geopolitical
hypothesis; Jonas & Wilson, 2018). However, this trend does not necessarily require
redrawing territorial boundaries and strengthening borders as in the conventional
notion of self-determination. Instead, these quests focus on the increased scope of and
potential interest from the bottom-up grassroots movements with regard to democratic
engagement, representation, deliberation, and, ultimately, experimentation (geodemo-
cratic hypothesis; Crameri, 2016; Harvey, 2008). In turn, by articulating the three hypoth-
eses of civic/metropolitanised nationalism, the outlook of the interest in democratic
engagement influences political agendas, arrangements for governance, and the pursuit
of a city-region’s own priorities as part of the ‘right to decide’ on its futures:
(1) The geoeconomic hypothesis refers to cities that have more cooperation with other
cities and regions or that coordinate their local policies at the city-regional level.
These cities are more likely to favour the ‘right to the city’ and to cooperatively
defend their own socio-economic interests. However, growing tensions between
nation-states and ‘their’ city-regions have resulted in either political re-scaling of
the state through pervasive devolution or resistance to such centrifugal pressures.
The financial crisis of 2008 led to questions regarding the suitability of a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ orchestration of state territoriality through hierarchical, top-down managed,
asymmetric relationships between centres and sub-ordinate, peripheral spaces, as
these relationships are particularly pertinent in unitary states. Does this imply the pol-
itical dissolution of nation-states per se? To some, particularly those in conventional
‘realist’ international relations debates, this hypothesis is heresy because states are
fixed and whole geographic entities, mirroring overly narrow notions of geographic
‘containers’ to enact institutionalized politics. However, the growing focus on the
economic dimension of statehood and its territorial and institutional manifestation
questions the validity of such familiar assumptions as overly simplistic, especially
in relation to the growing complexity of the interdependent metropolitan world.
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(2) The previous hypothesis leads to the geopolitical hypothesis, which discusses cities
that have a more self-conscious sense of metropolitan belonging in connection with
their region (hinterland). These cities are more likely to negotiate and permanently
update city-regional devolution regimes in relation to the nation-state. For these
city-regions, this perspective has provoked a more explicit and self-conscious sense
of metropolitan belonging and has renewed the idea of the ‘right to the city’ as the
‘individual liberty to access urban resources’ (Harvey, 2008, p. 23). The ‘right to the
city’ is an idea and slogan first proposed by Henri Lefebvre in 1968 that has been
reclaimed in recent decades by grassroots movements to illustrate the city as a co-pro-
duced space. The notion of the ‘right to the city’ has gained international recognition
in recent years, as observed in the United Nations Habitat III process and the New
Urban Agenda’s recognition of this concept as the vision of ‘cities for all’. This
hypothesis is particularly evident and timely in Barcelona, where an alternative metro-
politanised narrative contrasts with the current hegemonic neoliberal urban model
(Islar & Irgil, 2018). Populist accusations of the ‘metropolitan elite’ abandoning the
‘rest’ of a territory while furthering their own interests highlights a re-arrangement
of the relationship among economic spaces, political agency, and democratic rep-
resentation. With an increasing number of cities and city-regions seemingly seeking
to ‘go it alone’, they have effectively embraced the ‘right to decide’ and acted more
autonomously as de facto devolved authorities.
(3) Geodemocratics is the foundation of the third hypothesis, which refers to cities that
transparently articulate and co-produce more decision-making processes in
cooperation with their citizens. These cities are more likely to nurture a deeper demo-
cratic citizenship within the city-region through well-informed consultations and
referenda. This condition challenges established structures that deliver state power
and control, as nation-states must respond to forms of spatialisation other than a
fixed territory. This situation clears a path for new geodemocratics, i.e. the represen-
tation of popular will in trans-scalar terms through deliberative bottom-up experimen-
tation with consultations and referenda (Qvortrup, 2014). As a result, the project of a
national society of citizens, especially liberalism’s twentieth-century version, appears
increasingly exhausted and discredited. Instead, this development offers new
avenues by which to propagate, justify, and construct the ‘right to decide’ (Davidson,
2016) as a wider, more urban, and outward-looking range of descriptors of ‘nation’, in
contrast to those offered by the non-metropolitanised version that conventionally
emphasises separating ‘inside’ from ‘outside’ as a populist and ethnic expression of
‘nationalism’. In this context, the ‘right to decide’ does not mean seceding as a
matter of course; rather, it refers to the ability to decide whether to secede or
perhaps only to decide on the degree of devolution, while also allowing full indepen-
dence (Guibernau, 2013). The ‘right to decide’may be a new version of a metropolitan-
based ‘right to the city’ (Harvey, 2008; Lefebvre, 1968; Purcell, 2013), in which the civic
quest for political-democratic ownership of the city is extended to citizenship. State ter-
ritoriality, with its particular metropolitan mode de vivre, is less of a descriptor and
more a sense of voluntary place-based belonging. Thus, a demos-driven ‘self-determi-
nation 2.0’, empowered by a wider range of political ideologies around a civic nation-
alist movement facilitates a bottom-up and inclusive city-regional political response
through ‘metropolitanised’ political parties and grassroots movements (Figure 2).
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Referring to this dynamic, Harvey (2008, p. 40) confirms that ‘Lefebvre was right to
insist that the revolution has to be urban, in the broadest sense of that term’. Therefore,
it remains to be seen whether metropolitan standing and capacity will provide extra
agency to small stateless city-regionalised nations on the basis that ‘their’ respective
metropolitan centres are of dominant relevance. This basis allows the strategic civic
nationalistic ambitions of the three cases presented below to be considered an
updated – or expanded – version of a metropolitan-based ‘right to the city’.
Analysis of the metropolitan moment in Catalonia, the Basque Country,
and Scotland: From the ‘right to the city’ to the ‘right to decide’ in
Barcelona, Bilbao, and Glasgow
These cases are selected because they fulfil the following five criteria. All cases (i) are
binary city and regional networked configurations called ‘city-regions’, defined as
‘widely recognized as pivotal socio-economic formations that are key to national and
international competitiveness as well as rebalancing the political restructuring processes
into nation-states, even changing the geoeconomic, geopolitical, and geodemocratic
dynamics beyond and between them’; (ii) are uniquely driven by devolution; (iii) are par-
ticularly bolstered by a strong post-industrial and internationalized metropolitan hub
(Barcelona, Bilbao, and Glasgow); (iv) claim the ‘right to decide’ their own political
status within the nation-state; and ultimately (v) fit into the taxonomy of small, stateless
nations in Europe (Calzada, 2015) (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Three small European stateless city-regionalised nations according to the three metropolitan
hypotheses, presented through a decalogue of dimensions. Source: OECD, EUROSTAT and EUSTAT.
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. Catalonia (Barcelona, Tarragona, Lleida, Girona, and Països Catalans)
. The Basque Country (Bilbao, Pamplona, San Sebastian, Vitoria, and Bayonne)
. Scotland (Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Dundee, Inverness, Perth, and Stirling)
The metropolitan moment in each case depends on the geoeconomic context; the geo-
political and geodemocratic hypotheses of national identity, the sense of cohesiveness, and
the democratic ownership shape the devolution agendas differently in Spain and the UK.
Failure to achieve the ‘right’mix of structure and political agency may weaken the chances
of attaining a mutually satisfactory balance between the claims of respective sovereignties
at the level of the territorial states and that of their constituent city-regions. The outcome
may lead to unresolved devolution conflicts by forcing two contradictory extremes: insist-
ing on the territorial integrity of the state through the homogeneous re-centralization
advocated by a state-centric ethnic nationalistic approach while also threatening that
integrity through attempts to force independence (right to secede).
Catalonia (Barcelona)
Although it is on Spain’s periphery, Catalonia has often held a central position in Spanish
politics (Ehrlich, 1997). During XIX and the most of the XX centuries, Barcelona was the
most advanced and modern city in Spain. Barcelona’s success furthered the prestige of the
‘Catalanist’ movement, which was initially exclusively federalist but in recent years has
become more pro-secessionist (Guibernau, 2013). The historical goal of mainstream ‘Cat-
alanism’ consisted of securing accommodations within Spain combined with direct par-
ticipation in the EU. However, this accommodation has resulted in an unstable
equilibrium, which includes recentralising policies originating from the Spanish central
government. Similarly, the expectation of a ‘Europe of Regions’ (Hepburn, 2008) is far
from fulfilled, reinforcing Catalonia’s perception that the only means to participate in
the EU is by having a state of its own. Thus, currently, the main claim articulated by
civic nationalism is the ‘right to decide’, which previously requested slight federal
reforms and national recognition within the nation-state but now opts for requesting
full independence due to the impossibility of attaining its former goals.
Compared with federalism and polycentricism, traditions of centralism and unitarism
provide different circumstances and different political-institutional consciousnesses of
power and representation. For instance, according to the Spanish Constitution, Spain is
a single ‘demos’ formed by ‘all Spaniards’, including the Catalans and Basques. Conse-
quently, any attempt to hold a referendum on self-determination is deemed illegal and
an attack on the very state that is representative of the whole demos. However, the 1.5
million people who demonstrated in Barcelona in favour of self-determination on 11 Sep-
tember 2012 – and on many occasions thereafter – illustrate the strength of the civic/
metropolitanised nationalistic movement (Serrano, 2013) that favours dissolving the
concept of a single ‘demos’ by overcoming the ethnic nature of citizenship, thus blending
the Spanish and Catalan identities with the opportunity to vote democratically in favour of
or against independence. In turn, these events question the validity of the single-state-
equals-single-demos doctrine. Legal arguments (‘Empire of Law’) no longer suffice.
Much of this confrontation appears to be related to the political inability of the Spanish
nation-state to contemplate alternatives, such as a shift from unitary to more federal
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structures; instead, the nation-state insists that the constitutional provisions for centralism
are non-negotiable. Demonstrating the two roles of such a metropolis, Barcelona, as
Spain’s primary international city, is an internationally oriented, recognized, and success-
ful metropolis, although much of the outside world simply views it as ‘Spanish’; however,
Barcelona also serves as the main platform for the expression and representation of
Catalan identity.
As a sign of its growing empowerment, in 1998, Barcelona approved the Municipal
Charter, which provided the framework for a devolution of institutional powers in local
policy-making coupled with greater financial resources to cover those responsibilities.
Thus, as Serrano (2013, p. 541) argues, ‘opposition by the Spanish central government
to delivering greater fiscal powers to Catalonia as a region has effectively been bypassed’.
In its metropolitan form, the scenario of independence has been gaining ‘realness’ and
more general political acceptability to the point where the Catalan government started
the process of unilateral disconnection from Spain. Unsurprisingly, Catalonia’s elected
parliament felt sufficiently emboldened after its successes in the 2015 and 2017 regional
elections to challenge Madrid’s insistence on continued centralization and the territorial
integrity of the state. The new radical-left mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau (BComú),
appears ‘cautiously ambivalent’ in confronting this situation, while Barcelona remains
trapped in the city-regional/metropolitan territory. Colau supports the popular referen-
dum to implement the ‘right to decide’ while also taking no clear position on Catalan inde-
pendence. This attitude illustrates how metropolitan interests embrace the
implementation of experimental democratic practices, such as consultations and refer-
enda, while leaving open the choice of each citizen to ‘decide or not’ regarding indepen-
dence from Spain.
Basque Country (Bilbao)
A similar conflict also appears within the complex and multi-faceted nature of the Basque
Country: The Basque Autonomous Community (BAC) and the Chartered Community of
Navarre (CCN) exist on the Spanish side, whereas the Northern French Basque Country
(NFBC) exist on the French side of the Basque Country. Bilbao is the primary metropo-
litan centre that projects Basqueness internationally. However, this paradiplomatic role
produces a Bilbaoese city-regional version, as the city also has its own metropolitan
agenda that seeks to step out of the Spanish-Basque context and into the international
arena in search of recognition as a place of new-found post-industrial economic compe-
tence and success. Bilbao has extended beyond the Basque context by combining metro-
politan international ambitions, traditions, and modus operandi with underlying
Basqueness. As in Glasgow and Barcelona, intertwined urban and metropolitan innovative
policies provided Bilbao international with recognition, confidence, and political ambi-
tion, which projected the city’s success onto the hinterland and beyond. This stance pro-
duces a particular ‘brand’ of identity by using the Basque Country to depict a small,
unique, manufacturing-based, resilient, financially self-governed territorial nation in
Europe. Since the organization known as Basque Country and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Aska-
tasuna, ETA) announced its dissolution on 2 May 2018, the city-region, which is spatially
configured as a polycentric city-network, has been making strong progress towards
improving both its external image, as evidenced by tourism, and its internally conditions.
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This city-region has done this by amalgamating – in a unified and peaceful setting – the
metropolitan manifestations of Basqueness in the main cities with those of the non-metro-
politan or rural hinterland from the Spanish and French sides of the border.
The Basque regional government decides local and regional policies via a complex pro-
vince-council-driven confederal system. Bilbao combines strong metropolitan political
leadership with an existing entrepreneurial urban culture. The latest developments in
defining Basque nationality include active engagement by a new government representing
CCN, which is driven by its capital city, Pamplona, and a mobilization of the Northern
French Basque Country (NFBC; Pays Basque). This engagement is also driven through
the provision of a new institutional setting entitled the ‘Single Commonwealth’, which
was voted into existence by the region’s constitutive municipalities as the backdrop for
a unified and historically Basque metropolitanised nation.
Scotland (Glasgow)
In the case of Scotland, the self-government demands that have been formulated since the
early 1970s under the banner of ‘devolution’ of powers to the city-region are built on a
much longer history of institutional and administrative autonomy. Since the 1970s,
Glasgow has retained a strong political agenda and voice of its own within those
debates by advocating the economic case of Scottish independence through the exponen-
tial growth of the SNP in the city; in 1995, the SNP won just one seat, while in 2017, it won
39 (Elias, 2018; Wilson, 2018). This result led to a strong showing in favour of indepen-
dence at the referendum, with 194,779 ‘yes’ votes over 169,347 ‘no’ votes, contrasting with
the overall win of the ‘no’ votes across Scotland (STV, 2014). This apparent ‘metropolitan
moment’ of casting votes suggests the fusion of a nationalist, independence-minded dis-
course with distinct metropolitan perspectives, experiences, and values that also include
a sense of ‘own’. Because of their relative ‘weight’, small nations with large metropolitan
areas are – as political-economic foci – disproportionately prone to the effects of the
‘metropolitan factor’. Through their independently built network relations that extend
beyond the immediate national context, dominant city-regions are moving to the fore-
ground of articulating and utilizing their growing international visibility and connectivity
to promote a particular (metropolitan) version of a nationalist agenda as part of the wider
quest for nation-based independent statehood based on internationalism. This develop-
ment requires fusing internationalism, social progressiveness, inclusiveness, and likely pol-
itical-economic entrepreneurialism.
At present, the role of metropolitanisation allows Glasgow to articulate in parallel a
diverse set of complex strategies – sometimes even antagonistic – by tailoring city-regional
internal compositions through collaborative urban networks: on the one hand, the British
Core Cities, and on the other hand, the Scottish Cities Alliance. Both positions are impor-
tant vehicles used to formulate goals, exercise power, and lobby political influence in aspir-
ing small stateless nations and existing nation-states as a whole. Specific metropolitan
interests are illustrated by the fact that Glasgow, now SNP-controlled, is a member in
both, which reveals the remarkable function that Glasgow plays in embracing a wide
range of political strategies. Whereas the British Core Cities group (2018) currently
lobbies the UK government through the articulation of an urban network composed of
its ten primary metropolitan hubs (Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, Glasgow, Leeds,
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Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, and Sheffield), the Scottish Cities Alliance
(2018) was formed by the Scottish Government in 2011 and is a founding member of the
Eurocities network in the EU. This latter alliance depicts a regionally cohesive composition
encompassing large (Glasgow and Edinburgh), medium (Aberdeen and Dundee), and
small (Inverness, Perth, and Stirling) urban hubs that contribute via specific projects to
the city-regional network configuration, while simultaneously being strongly in favour
of Scottish independence. In effect, for the Scottish Cities Alliance, nationality (indepen-
dence arguments) and metropolitan interests (geodemocratics) reinforce each other and
blend to create a new congruent synthesis as an expression of a civic or metropolitanised
nationalism.
Conclusion
This article has presented the cases of three small stateless city-regional nations to provide a
better understanding of how metropolitanisation and the ‘right to decide’ are increasingly
invigorating the devolution-driven debate in Europe while also provoking the (re)emer-
gence of a pattern of stateless civic/metropolitanised nationalism and its opposition in
the form of an ethnic/non-metropolitanised nationalism. In the context of the secessionist
movements that have re-emerged in the UK and Spain since 2014, this article’s main argu-
ment is that metropolitan areas andmajor cities such as Barcelona, Bilbao, and Glasgow are
pervasively fuelling the devolution debate according to the three hypotheses presented:
geoeconomics, geopolitics, and geodemocratics. Furthermore, the findings reveal that
geo-democratic manifestations are currently becomingmuchmore essential. Paradoxically
equal in the three cases, more parliamentary support in the regional governments and city
councils – as well as grassroots demonstrations claiming the ‘right to decide’ – are taking
place in Barcelona, Bilbao, and Glasgow. However, it appears that events such as referen-
dums and consultations to articulate the ‘right to decide’ are less likely to occur in the future.
Figure 3 depicts the main conclusion of the article. In contrast to widespread percep-
tions, a majority of all three regional parliaments back the potential exercise of the
‘right to decide’ in the following order: 75% of MPs in the Basque parliament,1 57% of
MPs in the Catalan parliament, and 54% of the MPs in the Scottish parliament. Likewise,
the same occurs within the three city councils, where 73% of the representatives in the
Bilbao City Council favour the ‘right to decide’; 71% of the Barcelona City Council and
54% of the Glasgow City Council also favour this right. Each case requires further exam-
ination, as the support could vary depending on political interplay. Although having pol-
itical support favours exercising the ‘right to decide’, it is not sufficient to ensure that right.
Another interesting avenue for research would be to find correlations between regional
and municipal political dynamics in terms of the interconnected multi-level governance
implications of devolution. As this article has argued from the beginning, gaining – or
not gaining – metropolitan support within city-regions will determine the future direc-
tions of devolution debates.
In comparative terms, the article’s empirical research assumed not only the potential
ambiguity of political parties regarding the ‘right to decide’ but also the methodological
dichotomy of civic and ethnic nationalisms; these assumptions were necessary to clas-
sify certain actors on the continuum. However, this article challenged the mainstream
view that does not distinguish the ‘right to decide’ from full independence, and it
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examined how the metropolitan arguments actually influence the development of
broader phenomena beyond the fixed nation-state territoriality by establishing two ver-
sions of nationalism: civic and ethnic. The (re)emergence of civic nationalism may stem
from the metropolitan ethos and demos. Likewise, this article encourages further
research that will improve theoretical frameworks and analytical tools (i) to better
examine civic/metropolitanised nationalism empirically as a pervasive, novel, emergent
and timely outcome that blends metropolitanisation phenomena, the ‘right to decide’,
devolution, inclusiveness, and manifestations of nationalisms and (ii) to accurately
interpret how metropolitan socio-political behaviour is forging the discursive and nor-
mative relevance of devolution.
To provide further nuanced causal explanations among the role of metropolitanisation
and the emergence of civic/metropolitanised nationalism through claims of the ‘right to
decide’ in devolution debates, this article has attempted to elucidate potential new research
avenues without aiming to be entirely prescriptive in regards to the presented findings.
Thus, the correlation among metropolitanisation, the ‘right to decide’, devolution, and
types of nationalism will require in-depth interdisciplinary fieldwork research to establish
solid foundations in accordance with what this article has preliminarily initiated.
To conclude, this article envisions that metropolitan-driven demand for the ‘right to
decide’ might inevitably provoke and determine unique new waves and scenarios
around devolution debates in each case. In such case, a ‘transformative alliance’ around
civic nationalist patterns is likely to continue gathering a wide range of ‘progressivist’ pol-
itical parties, social movements, and civic groups in a novel communitarian amalgamation
that alters the contemporary nation-states of Spain and the UK. Parliamentary represen-
tation and grassroots movements may put pressure on the devolution debate given that the
Figure 3. Favourable/unfavourable proportion (%) regarding the exercise of the ‘right to decide’ via
seats of representation in the regional governments and city councils (MPs) of the three European
small stateless city-regionalised nations. (Elaborated by the author from electoral summaries).
SPACE AND POLITY 357
majority in all three regional and municipal parliaments back the ‘right to decide’ officially
and discursively. However, gaining critical mass from the metropolitan areas will remain
unpredictable, as city-regional strategic competence is a key political determinant.
Note
1. We must employ the term BAC (Basque Autonomous Community), insofar as the Basque
regional parliament represent only citizens of this administrative entity. The Basque
Country encompasses a wider territorial dimension consisting of the BAC, CCN (Chartered
Community of Navarre), and the NFBC (Northern French Basque Country) (Calzada, 2015).
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